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T
wo years after the end of the 2007-09 recession, the unem-
ployment rate in the United States remains above 9 percent—
roughly double its pre-recession level. 
This elevated level of unemployment has a cyclical and a structural 
component. The cyclical component reflects weakness in the demand 
for goods and services, which makes employers reluctant to expand their 
payrolls. By contrast, the structural component reflects potential mis-
matches in the labor market. These mismatches may include the types 
of jobs being created versus the skills of unemployed workers, and loca-
tions of new jobs relative to unemployed workers. Because their causes 
are different, addressing structural problems in the labor market requires 
strategies that are different from those that address cyclical problems.
U.S. labor market policies historically have focused on providing 
unemployment insurance during downturns. These programs have 
provided financial support for unemployed workers on the premise 
that the cyclical downturns would prove to be temporary. Because these 
programs do not directly help workers find jobs, they are called passive 
labor market policies.
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By contrast, active labor market policies seek to increase the prob-
ability that unemployed workers will find jobs through more direct 
approaches, such as training and job-search assistance for unemployed 
workers, and incentives to employers for expanding their workforces. 
In a number of foreign countries, these policies have been used exten-
sively to combat structural unemployment. Would active labor market 
policies be an effective tool to help combat high unemployment in the 
United States?
This article examines the experiences of a sample of countries in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
that have a history of using active labor market policies. The analysis 
finds that two types of active programs can be particularly effective: 
training programs that equip unemployed workers with skills in demand 
and job-search assistance that matches unemployed workers with em-
ployers. Beyond these two program types, there is little evidence that 
other active programs (such as employment incentives and direct job 
creation) reduce unemployment significantly. These findings—together 
with evidence that the U.S. labor market currently suffers from a certain 
amount of structural unemployment—suggest that the United States 
could benefit from more training programs and job-search assistance.
The first section describes the passive and active labor market poli-
cies used in OECD countries. The second section uses cross-country 
data to estimate the ability of active labor market policies to reduce 
unemployment. The third section discusses the implications for the 
United States.
I.  LABOR MARKET POLICIES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
Many OECD countries previously have confronted stubbornly 
high unemployment, even during periods of economic growth. In Eu-
rope, the phenomenon was so prevalent that it was called “eurosclero-
sis.” Partly as a result of these historical experiences, OECD countries 
have instituted different labor market policies to help deal with persis-
tent unemployment. 
Economists typically divide labor market policies into passive and 
active policies. The policies differ in their approach to supporting un-
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most effective. This section reviews the various passive and active labor 
market policies and describes some of their benefits and drawbacks.
Passive labor market policies
Unemployment benefits and early retirement benefits comprise 
the bulk of passive labor market policies (PLMP) in use across OECD 
countries (Chart 1). Unemployment benefits are intended to provide in-
come support for workers who are experiencing a period of jobless-
ness or involuntary work reduction. The most common unemployment 
benefit is unemployment insurance (UI), which is payable to unem-
ployed workers with some kind of work history and who satisfy other 
criteria. A second type of unemployment benefit is unemployment as-
sistance (UA). UA applies to workers who, for some reason, do not 
meet the criteria for UI or have exceeded the maximum duration of UI 
benefits. UA tends to be less generous than UI and normally is means 
tested.1 Unemployment benefits also may take the form of partial or 
part-time benefits, which apply to workers who have had their working 
hours reduced.
Early retirement programs assist workers near retirement age who are 
out of work and unlikely to find new work. These programs provide 
assistance until the workers reach the normal retirement age. They are 
distinct from other retirement programs, including pensions and Social 
Security or its equivalent, for which many older workers are eligible.2 
One example is the Finnish unemployment pension system. Unem-
ployed workers in Finland who were born before 1950 and are between 
the ages of 60 and 64 are eligible for an “unemployment pension.” They 
must have worked for at least five years during the previous 15 years and 
reached the maximum duration of unemployment allowance of 500 
days before age 60. These unemployment pensions are automatically 
converted to a universal social insurance benefit once the worker reaches 
the official retirement age of 65.
Other types of passive policies are designed to help maintain work-
ers’ income after a change or disruption in their employers’ activities, 
but these expenditures are less than 2 percent of the total spending on 
passive policies.3
The ability of passive policies to combat high unemployment rates 
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support for unemployed workers and their families. Because workers 
who receive unemployment benefits may not have many other income 
sources, economists believe recipients spend most of these benefits. In 
this sense, unemployment benefits are a stabilizer for the economy, as 
they provide automatic countercyclical fiscal policy in downturns and 
cushion declines in aggregate demand (Blinder). In addition, generous 
unemployment benefits may improve the quality of matches among 
unemployed workers and employers. Such benefits enable workers to 
take more time in their job search rather than accept the first position 
they can find (Acemoglu and Shimer). Aside from increasing work-
ers’ productivity, better matches potentially reduce the possibility that 
workers will be terminated and rejoin the unemployed. 
On the negative side, generous unemployment benefits may dis-
courage the unemployed from actively looking for jobs, therefore po-
tentially increasing unemployment durations (Summers;  Ljungqvist 
and Sargent). In turn, workers who suffer long unemployment peri-
ods may have a lower probability of returning to employment (Meyer; 
Hornstein and Lubik). Although the negative effects of unemployment 
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contracting, they are mitigated when the economy is booming: When 
jobs are readily available, the disincentive effects from unemployment 
benefits will be offset by strong labor demand. 
Active labor market policies
In contrast to passive policies, the focus of active labor market pol-
icies (ALMP) is to increase the employability of unemployed workers. 
Generally, ALMP fall into six categories: training programs, job-search 
assistance, employment incentives, supported employment, direct job 
creation, and other policies (Chart 2).
Training programs primarily focus on vocational training for the 
unemployed or those who are at risk of losing their jobs. Training pro-
grams provide workers with specific skills that are in demand to smooth 
the transition to new employment. For example, the German govern-
ment operates extensive training programs that include several types 
of interventions. These include so-called “further training,” aimed at 
technical development and advancing the careers of trainees, as well as 
retraining programs that support up to two years of education toward 
a new vocational education degree or certification. Training may also 
include grants to firms for general staff training and incentives to em-
ployers to recruit apprentices or train workers from targeted groups. 
Training programs make up the largest share of ALMP spending.
Job-search assistance includes programs intended to connect em-
ployers to the unemployed more efficiently than they might have 
matched up otherwise. It includes referrals to available jobs or training, 
job brokerage services for employers, and financial assistance to help 
pay for the costs of a job search or relocation to take a job.
Employment incentives are temporary payments to facilitate the 
transition of the unemployed into jobs. These include employer sub-
sidies to hire new employees, as well as targeted bonuses paid to in-
dividuals for taking a job. Employment incentives also may include 
payments to employers to facilitate continued employment during 
restructuring.
Supported employment includes subsidies for employing workers 
with a reduced capacity to work, as well as vocational rehabilitation or 
training for workers to prepare them to move to nonsupported work.40  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Direct job creation includes programs that create temporary, nonmar-
ket jobs that would not have existed without the policy. These jobs often 
are in the public or nonprofit sector and are targeted at long-term un-
employed or groups that are difficult to place in other types of jobs. An 
example is France’s “Jobs for Young People” program, which subsidizes 
fixed-term contracts for young people in government, nonprofit civil or-
ganizations, and private organizations that manage public services.
Other policies are quite diverse. They include start-up incentives to 
encourage entrepreneurship among the unemployed, which were intro-
duced in 2003 in Germany as part of the Hartz reforms.4 They also in-
clude a variety of other spending, such as administration expenses associ-
ated with labor market programs that are included in other categories.
By design, active labor market policies aim to increase the em-
ployability of jobless workers and reduce unemployment, regardless 
of whether the economy is in an upturn or a downturn. In practice, 
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cycle. This variation occurs because the largest categories of active poli-
cies—such as training and job-search assistance—are meant to improve 
the quality and efficiency of matching the unemployed (labor supply) 
with employers (labor demand). Therefore, if labor demand is weak 
and few jobs are available, active policies may be less effective.5
The use of passive and active policies in different countries
The level of spending on labor market policies differs widely across 
OECD countries. Between 1998 and 2008 in 21 OECD countries, to-
tal expenditures on passive and active labor market policies as a fraction 
of GDP ranged from about 4 percent in Denmark to 0.25 percent in 
the United Kingdom (Chart 3). The United States is near the bottom 
of this list, spending slightly less than 0.5 percent of GDP on labor 
market policies during this time. 
In addition, the fraction of spending on active versus passive poli-
cies differs across countries. Outside the United States, the average 
country in Chart 3 devoted 59 percent of labor market policy expen-
ditures to PLMP and 41 percent to ALMP. In the United States, how-
Chart 3
RELATIVE LABOR MARKET POLICY SPENDING, 1998-2008
Note: The bars represent the average annual labor market policy spending as a percentage of GDP between 1998 
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ever, 70 percent of expenditures went to PLMP and 30 percent went 
to ALMP.
Another common method to measure spending on labor market 
policies is to consider expenditures per unemployed worker as a per-
centage of GDP per capita.6 This measure adjusts for differences across 
countries in unemployment rates and the size of the economy. Between 
1998 and 2008, average expenditures on PLMP in the United States 
on each unemployed worker were about 12 percent of GDP per capita, 
while the average level for the 20 other OECD countries in Chart 3 was 
about 25 percent of GDP per capita. The U.S. expenditures on ALMP 
were even less: Over the same period, expenditures on ALMP per un-
employed worker in the United States were about 5 percent of GDP 
per capita, while the average spending per unemployed worker for the 
20 other OECD countries was approximately 19 percent of GDP per 
capita. How large were the effects of these different uses of ALMP on 
unemployment? Does the form of ALMP spending matter in terms of 
its effect on the unemployment rate? The next section provides a more 
formal analysis to answer these questions.
II.  HOW EFFECTIVE ARE ACTIVE LABOR MARKET 
POLICIES IN REDUCING UNEMPLOYMENT? 
The effectiveness of active labor market policies in reducing the 
unemployment rate can be quantified by examining the experiences 
of different OECD countries that have used a variety of labor market 
policies over multiple years. In particular, panel regressions can uncover 
the relationship between the key variable of interest—the unemploy-
ment rate—and the factors that may influence this variable, such as 
different labor market policies and other relevant variables. This exer-
cise provides estimates of the overall effectiveness of ALMP in reducing 
unemployment and the effectiveness of individual ALMP categories, 
such as training programs, job-search assistance, employment incen-
tives, and others.
A nation’s unemployment rate is influenced by many factors, and 
labor market policies comprise only one such factor. Properly measur-
ing the impact of these policies on unemployment rates requires care-
fully controlling for other factors. For example, in addition to active 
and passive labor market policies, countries may have varied unemploy-ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2011  43
ment rates because they differ in certain institutional features, such as 
the degree of employment protection or the extent of unionization. 
Tax policies also influence unemployment rates through the so-called 
“labor tax wedge” between the employer’s labor cost and the corre-
sponding net take-home pay of the employee.7
The business cycle plays an important role in determining the un-
employment rate. When the economy is booming, the unemployment 
rate tends to be low even if few resources are devoted to labor market 
policies. In a recession, the unemployment rate usually will be high 
even if labor market policies are used more intensively. Models that 
ignore changes in aggregate conditions will inaccurately estimate the 
effects of labor market policies. Thus, the output gap—the difference 
between the actual level of output and the level of output associated 
with a stable inflation rate—is included as an explanatory variable to 
summarize conditions in the aggregate economy.8 
Although all the factors mentioned above usually vary over time, 
time-invariant and country-specific factors (such as culture, geography, 
and political systems) also may cause unemployment rates to differ across 
countries. Thus, the models also include a “fixed-effect” component.9
The ideal data for estimating the effect of labor market policies 
on unemployment would be a series of observations of different 
unemployment rates associated with different policies and institu-
tional measures. Unfortunately, policies and institutional features 
do not change frequently within a given country. Therefore, this 
article explores the annual cross-country experiences in a sample of 
20 OECD countries that engaged in ALMP over the period 1998-
2008.10  
Overall, active labor market policies tend to reduce the unem-
ployment rate (Table 1, column 1). The regression results show that 
an increase in spending on active labor market policies of 1 percent 
typically reduces the unemployment rate by 0.11 percentage point. 
To put this statistic in perspective, the average level of ALMP ex-
penditures per unemployed worker is 19 percent of GDP per capita 
across OECD countries in the sample. Increasing this spending to 
20 percent of GDP per capita—which would require an additional 
$274 of spending per unemployed person in 2011 dollars—would 
reduce unemployment by 0.11 percentage point.1144  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Table 1
EFFECTS OF LABOR MARKET POLICIES ON  
UNEMPLOYMENT
Notes: Standard errors indicated in parentheses. * Indicates significant at 90 percent level. ** Indicates significant 
at 95 percent level. Labor market policies are defined as spending per unemployed worker as a percentage of GDP 
per capita. This table reports the regression results for the three different specifications considered in this article. 
Specification 1 examines the aggregate effects of ALMP and PLMP on the unemployment rate. Specification 2 ex-
amines the effects of unemployment benefits on the unemployment rate. Specification 3 breaks down ALMP into 




Labor Force Participation Rate 0.15* 0.20** 0.26**
(0.09) (0.90) (0.10)
Union Density 0.30** 0.35** 0.31**
(0.05) (0.07) (0.09)
Employment Protection -0.92 -1.44 0.88
(0.99) (1.12) (1.67)
Tax Wedge 0.20* 0.15 0.49**
(0.11) (0.12) (0.16)




Initial Unemployment Benefit Replacement Ratio  0.01 -0.04 
(0.04) (0.04)
















Observations (N) 157 119 119
Overall R-squared 0.01 0.04 0.03ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2011  45
By contrast, passive labor market policies typically do not reduce 
the unemployment rate. The empirical results suggest that if PLMP 
expenditures per unemployed worker increase by 1 percent of GDP 
per capita, from the OECD average of 25 percent to 26 percent, the 
unemployment rate would increase by 0.01 percentage point. This 
result suggests that more PLMP spending may not help reduce un-
employment and may even increase the unemployment rate, though 
the point estimate is not statistically different from zero. As the lit-
erature studying UI benefits suggests, when provided with more 
generous benefits, unemployed workers will have less incentive to 
look for jobs and will be more reluctant to accept lower income 
jobs (Ljungqvist and Sargent). Both of these factors may lead to an 
increase in the unemployment rate. 
To pursue this idea further, column 2 of  Table 1 separates 
PLMP expenditures into two common measures: the duration of 
unemployment benefits and the ratio of unemployment benefits to 
the past wage, also called the replacement ratio. The estimates show 
that, if the maximum unemployment-benefit duration increases by 
one year, the unemployment rate increases by about 0.29 percent.12 
Similarly, increasing the replacement ratio also increases the unem-
ployment rate, but again the associated effect is economically small 
and not statistically significant.
Several other variables have significant effects on the unemploy-
ment rate. For example, an increase in the labor force participation 
rate typically increases the unemployment rate. Wider union cov-
erage is associated with a higher unemployment rate, possibly be-
cause unionization pushes up labor costs. Similarly, a larger labor 
tax wedge increases the unemployment rate because it raises labor 
costs for employers and thus reduces the demand for labor. Finally, 
the output gap is always negatively correlated with the unemploy-
ment rate. 
Although active policies are effective overall in reducing unemploy-
ment rates, certain policies may be better than others. To assess this 
possibility, the model is rerun after breaking down spending among ac-
tive policies into the commonly defined categories (Table 1, column 3). 
The regression results suggest that two ALMP categories appear 
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and job-search assistance.13 Increasing the expenditures per unem-
ployed worker on these two active policies by 1 percent of GDP 
per capita is estimated to reduce the unemployment rate by 0.20 
percentage point and 0.31 percentage point, respectively.14 However, 
the mechanisms through which these two policies help reduce the 
unemployment rate are very different. Training is designed to im-
prove the employability of unemployed workers by enhancing their 
skills, while job-search assistance tries to make it easier to match the 
unemployed with employers. 
The results for other types of active programs are mixed. Al-
though the regression results suggest that the other policies category 
can reduce the unemployment rate, it is difficult to understand the 
mechanism through which this category works because the expen-
ditures for this group mainly are devoted to benefits administration, 
which is not considered to be a typical tool of ALMP.15 Although 
programs such as employment incentives and supported employ-
ment appear to reduce the unemployment rate as well, their effects 
are not statistically significant.
Finally, the regressions suggest one counterintuitive finding. In the 
sample of OECD countries, higher spending on direct job-creation 
programs tends to be associated with a higher rate of unemployment. 
How can increased spending on direct job creation result in fewer jobs 
and hence higher unemployment? 
The answer lies in the discrepancy between spending on direct 
job-creation programs and the number of jobs actually created by that 
spending—also known as the stock of participants in direct job-cre-
ation programs. Direct job-creation programs typically target certain 
unemployed workers who have specific difficulties in acquiring jobs. As 
such, increased spending on these programs often reflects higher costs 
of putting participants to work, rather than more jobs being created by 
that spending.16
The cost-effectiveness of active labor market policies
Although some types of active policies appear to be more effective 
than others in reducing unemployment rates, there is concern about 
whether these policies are cost-effective. Between the costs associated 
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recent financial crisis, many OECD countries face high levels of govern-
ment debt. As a result, ensuring that active policies are an effective use of 
government spending is crucial. To address these concerns, this section 
considers the cost-effectiveness of ALMP.
The cost-effectiveness analysis focuses on added economic value 
from ALMP, measured by increased GDP. In the simplest setting, if 
spending one extra dollar on active policies tends to increase GDP by 
more than one dollar, the policy passes the cost-effectiveness test.17 Fol-
lowing this spirit, the cost-effectiveness analysis compares the total cost 
of increasing ALMP expenditures per unemployed worker by 1 percent 
of GDP per capita with the increased GDP that is attributable to that 
policy. If the benefit of a particular type of active policy is greater than 
the cost, it is considered cost-effective.
To provide a comprehensive comparison, the cost-effectiveness anal-
ysis considers both active policies that have a significant association with 
reduced unemployment rates (overall ALMP, training, and job-search 
assistance) as well as the categories that tend to reduce the unemploy-
ment rate but whose effects are not statistically significant (employment 
incentives and supported employment programs).
To calculate the change in GDP from increased use of ALMP, three 
estimates are needed. The first is the effect of the active policy on the 
unemployment rate. The regression in the previous subsection provides 
this estimate: it measures the change in the unemployment rate from a 1 
percent change in ALMP spending. For example, column 1 of  Table 1 
shows that increasing overall ALMP spending by 1 percent is associated 
with a 0.11 percentage point decline in the unemployment rate.
The second translates the change in ALMP spending into GDP 
terms, which is necessary because the regression uses spending per un-
employed worker as a fraction of GDP per capita. Continuing the exam-
ple, increasing ALMP spending per unemployed by 1 percent of GDP 
per capita cost 0.04 percent of GDP on average for the countries in the 
sample, or about $230 million (in 2011 dollars).18 
The third estimate needed for the analysis is the effect of the change 
in the unemployment rate on GDP.19 Two different ways to measure the 
impact of a change in unemployment on GDP are considered, giving 
rise to two cost-effectiveness approaches. The first approach uses Okun’s 
law to determine the extent to which GDP varies with the change in 48  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
the unemployment rate.20 The second approach directly calculates the 
change in GDP after making certain assumptions about changes in the 
labor force and workers’ productivity.21
Despite their differences, both approaches find that active labor 
market policies are overall cost-effective in reducing the unemployment 
rate. Table 2 presents the results based on Okun’s law. A 1 percent in-
crease in total ALMP spending reduces the unemployment rate by 0.11 
percentage point (row 1). The cost of increasing ALMP spending is 
0.04 percent. However, the decrease in unemployment associated with 
increasing total ALMP spending results in a 0.09 percent increase in 
GDP. Because the increase in GDP is larger than the cost, the policy is 
cost-effective. 
In general, the Okun’s law approach finds that most active poli-
cies are cost-effective. This includes the two policies that were found 
to have a significant association with reduced unemployment rates—
training and job-search assistance—as well as employment incentives 
and supported employment.
Table 3 presents the results from varying the productivity of the 
newly employed. Once again, overall ALMP spending is cost-effective 
Table 2
COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS, OKUN’S LAW
Row Policy
Change in  
unemployment,
percentage points







1. ALMP -0.11 0.04 0.09 Yes
2. Training -0.20 0.12 0.16 Yes
3.
Job-Search 








-0.05 0.04 0.04 Yes
Notes:  As explained in Approach 1, the estimate of Okun’s law is used in calculating the change in GDP. The 
Okun’s law relationship is estimated for all countries over the sample period. The explanation of ALMP categories 
is found in Section I. The cost in terms of GDP represents the cost of increasing expenditures per unemployed 
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(row 1). This is true whether the newly employed workers are equal-
ly productive relative to previously employed workers (in which case 
GDP increases by 0.12 percent) or half as productive (in which case 
GDP increases by 0.06 percent). 
Notably, the results from Table 3 show the importance of pro-
ductivity in assessing the cost-effectiveness of various types of active 
policies. Intuitively, adding less-productive workers to the ranks of the 
employed contributes less to GDP. Whether a program can pass the 
cost-effectiveness test thus depends both on how much it increases em-
ployment and the productivity of those workers. If the newly employed 
are unskilled relative to existing workers or their skills do not match 
their new jobs, the program may reduce the unemployment rate, but 
the increased value in terms of GDP cannot cover the expenditures 
associated with the program.22 If the productivity of newly employed 
workers is low, the active labor market policies studied in this article 
could fail the cost-effectiveness test. From this point of view, programs 
that either can improve the productivity of unemployed workers or 
Table 3
COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS, VARYING LABOR 
FORCE AND PRODUCTIVITY
Notes: The change in unemployment is based on Approach 2 as explained in Appendix C. The cost in terms of 
GDP represents the cost of increasing expenditures per unemployed worker on each policy by 1 percent of GDP 
per capita.
Assumptions: no change 
in the labor force, newly 
employed workers are as 
productive as previously 
employed workers
Assumptions: no change 
in the labor force, newly 
employed workers are 
half as productive as pre-
viously employed workers
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2. Training -0.20 0.12 0.22 Yes 0.11 No
3. Job-Search 
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-0.05 0.04 0.05 Yes 0.02 No50  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
can better match the skills of unemployed workers with related jobs are 
more likely to be cost-effective.23
Training programs and supported employment programs are most 
affected by the productivity of the hires they create. If newly employed 
workers are just as productive as previously employed workers, then train-
ing and supported employment programs are cost-effective (Table 3, rows 
2 and 5, respectively). However, the programs are not cost-effective if the 
newly employed are only half as productive as the previously employed.
III.  WOULD ACTIVE LABOR MARKET POLICIES HELP 
REDUCE UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? 
The U.S. unemployment rate rose dramatically during the 2007-
09 recession. After peaking at 10.1 percent in October 2009, the un-
employment rate has remained about 9 percent two years after the of-
ficial end of the recession (Chart 4). Further illustrating the weakness in 
the labor market, more than 40 percent of the unemployed have been 
out of work for at least 27 weeks. 
A number of factors have contributed to this persistently elevated 
unemployment in the United States.
First and most importantly, weak demand in the U.S. economy has 
contributed to high unemployment (for example, Kocherlakota). Firms 
facing little growth in demand for their goods and services have no need 
to expand production and hire more workers, or they may be able to 
expand production slightly through productivity gains. This lack of de-
mand leads to few job openings, slow hiring, and high unemployment.
Second, mismatch in the labor market also may be contributing 
to the weak job market. One estimate suggests that mismatch across 
industries and occupations accounts for 0.8 percentage point to 1.4 
percentage points of the recent rise in the unemployment rate (Şahin 
and others).24 This mismatch occurs because the recession affected dif-
ferent sectors of the economy differently. For example, many workers 
in the construction sector lost their jobs during the recession. However, 
in the recovery, more jobs have been created in education and health 
services than in construction. Therefore, one problem for construction 
workers who lost their jobs is that their skills may not match the skills 
demanded by industries adding new jobs. 
Third, the depressed housing market may contribute to the high 
unemployment rate because it reduces the mobility of the unemployed. ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2011  51
Unemployed workers may be unable to sell their houses and move 
to an area with more promising employment prospects—a situation 
economists have termed “house lock” (Estevão and Tsounta). Because 
the recession and recovery have affected various regions of the country 
unevenly, reduced household mobility may be an impediment to un-
employed workers being able to take advantage of relatively stronger 
growth in other areas of the country.25
Fourth, extensions of UI benefits in the last few years also may have 
increased the unemployment rate. As discussed earlier, extended UI 
benefits may reduce the incentives for unemployed workers to search 
actively for jobs or to take low-wage jobs they might have taken with-
out the extended benefits. The extensions of UI benefits during and fol-
lowing the recession appear to have increased the U.S. unemployment 
rate by 0.8 percentage point to 1.7 percentage points (Fujita; Valletta 
and Kuang).26
Solving these problems in the U.S. labor market requires diverse 
strategies, and clearly there are no simple solutions. Nevertheless, ac-
tive labor market policies—especially training and job-search assis-
tance—may hold some promise for helping reduce skill and geographic   
Chart 4
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mismatch in the labor market. The previous section found that these 
policies have been a cost-effective way to help combat unemployment 
in other OECD countries. Moreover, the United States has spent much 
less on ALMP than most other OECD countries, suggesting that there 
is scope for further programs. Thus, it is useful to apply the analysis of 
ALMP to the U.S. economy to provide some preliminary evidence on 
how active policies could help reduce the U.S. unemployment rate.
 For example, one interesting question is: “How much would the 
United States have to spend on active labor market policies to reduce 
the unemployment rate by 1 percentage point, say, from 9 percent to 
8 percent?” To answer this question, Table 4 provides the estimated 
costs associated with using different programs to achieve this goal. The 
estimated amount the United States would have to spend using overall 
ALMP to help reduce the unemployment rate by 1 percentage point 
is about $79.5 billion (in 2011 dollars).27 If the United States were to 
focus only on training programs, the costs would be $43.7 billion. On 
the other hand, it would cost $28.7 billion if the government only used 
job-search assistance to reduce the unemployment rate by the same 
amount. Based on the results in the previous section, such spending 
should also be cost-effective if the productivity of the newly employed 
workers is high enough.
Reducing unemployment by 1 percentage point using employment 
incentives or supported employment would cost more—$56.8 billion 
and $191.8 billion, respectively. This significantly larger spending 
mainly reflects the much smaller estimates of the effects of these types 
of spending on unemployment (Table 1, column 3).28  
These results should be read cautiously for several reasons. First, 
the spending amounts reported are not sufficient to reduce the un-
employment rate on their own. In particular, as discussed in previous 
sections, training programs and job-search assistance mainly help the 
unemployed gain needed skills for new jobs or help them find new 
jobs more efficiently. In this sense, spending on these programs can 
help reduce the unemployment rate if sufficient jobs already exist in the 
economy. If there are not enough jobs available, however, the effects 
of increasing spending on training programs and job-search assistance 
may be much smaller.
Second, the statistical analysis in this article is based on estimates 
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bor market differs from other OECD countries in many respects. For 
example, economists have noted important differences between the 
United States and other OECD countries in terms of the degree of 
employment protection, unionization, tax wedges, the labor force par-
ticipation rate, the generosity of unemployment benefits, and other la-
bor market institutions. Although many of these differences have been 
taken into account in the analysis, no model can perfectly capture all 
differences. It is possible there are factors not taken into account that 
limit the applicability of the results of Section II for the United States. 
Third, the models in this article are relatively simple. They char-
acterize linear relationships between unemployment and labor market 
policies. They are also static, focusing on the effects of labor market 
policies on unemployment within the same period. Although these 
techniques are common in policy evaluation and are relatively easy to 
understand and interpret, they may not capture the dynamic and non-
linear effects of ALMP on unemployment. 
Fourth, properly designing ALMP for the United States may be 
challenging. Although certain active policies can reduce the aggregate 
unemployment rate on average, particular labor market policies may 
have a wide range of effects on the employment probabilities and earn-
ing prospects of individuals (Heckman and others). In addition, effec-
tive ALMP must be designed to fit the specific structure of a country’s 
labor market. Thus, directly copying from the models of other coun-
tries may not be appropriate or helpful. 
Finally, the impact of the use of ALMP on the government budget 
also should be taken into account because these policies mainly rely on 
Table 4
ESTIMATED COSTS OF REDUCING U.S.  
UNEMPLOYMENT
Policy Cost of reducing U.S. unemployment rate 






Note: Costs in 2011 dollars, adjusted using the GDP deflator for the 2011 Q1 third release.54  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
public funds. In the long run, ALMP may help reduce unemployment, 
increase GDP, and thus potentially increase tax revenues. However, it 
takes time for active policies to reduce unemployment, and thus the 
spending on these programs may increase the government’s fiscal deficit 
in the short run. In considering whether to implement ALMP, it also is 
wise to compare the trade-offs of spending on ALMP with other poli-
cies that have the potential to reduce unemployment by boosting weak 
demand.
Nevertheless, the results in this article suggest that the United States 
may benefit from investing more in ALMP—or by combining passive 
and active labor market policies as other countries have—to hasten a 
decline in the unemployment rate as the economic recovery proceeds.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This article uses data from 20 OECD countries during 1998-2008 
to study the effects of active labor market policies on unemployment 
and whether these policies also are cost-effective. The analysis finds that 
overall active labor market policies are cost-effective in reducing unem-
ployment. Within major categories of active policies, training programs 
that help the unemployed gain the skills needed in the labor market 
and job-search assistance that improves the efficiency with which work-
ers are matched with employers are especially useful in reducing unem-
ployment rates. 
These findings, together with the evidence from some recent stud-
ies that the level of structural unemployment has risen in the United 
States, suggest that using more training programs and job-search as-
sistance may be helpful in reducing the high unemployment rate in the 
United States.ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2011  55
APPENDIX A
DATA DESCRIPTION
The regression analysis uses annual data from 1998–2008 on 20 
OECD countries. The countries analyzed were selected on the basis of 
data availability over the duration of the sample. Except for the data on 
replacement ratios, all data were taken from various components of the 
OECD.Stat database. 
Data on the unemployment rate and labor force participation come 
from the OECD Annual Labor Force Survey. The Survey includes data 
from the European Union’s Eurostat database. The measure of trade 
union density generally is collected by the OECD from national survey 
and administrative data and occasionally based on estimates.
The OECD’s measure of employment protection is constructed 
by weighting 21 different indicators of strictness of regulations for dis-
missing workers (for example, notification requirements and severance 
pay) and for hiring temporary or fixed-contract workers.
Data on ALMP and PLMP come from OECD’s labor market pro-
grams data. OECD breaks ALMP spending as a percentage of GDP 
into seven groups: (1) Public Employment Services (PES) and Admin-
istration, (2) Training, (3) Job Rotation and Sharing, (4) Employment 
Incentives, (5) Supported Employment and Rehabilitation, (6) Direct 
Job Creation, and (7) Start-up incentives. The first group also includes 
benefits administration. Groups (3) and (7) are small relative to other 
categories. Thus, this article aggregates ALMP along the categories in 
Section I. 
 Data on replacement ratios come from the OECD’s Tax-Bene-
fit Indicator statistics. The initial unemployment benefit replacement   
ratio is the percentage of wages replaced net of taxes during the initial 
period of unemployment. The replacement ratio is averaged over eight   
different types of households, reflecting two different wage levels (either 
67 percent or 100 percent of the national average wage), marital status   
(either single or married with only one person earning), and the presence 
of dependent children (either no children or two children). Following 
the literature, the measure for the duration of unemployment benefits is   
calculated as the replacement ratio in the first year of unemployment   
divided by the replacement ratio over the first five years of unemployment.56  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Data on the output gap—the deviation of actual GDP from poten-
tial GDP—is taken from the OECD’s annual Economic Outlook. 
The tax wedge is measured as the average difference between total 
labor compensation and net take-home pay as a ratio of total labor com-
pensation, and is taken from the OECD’s Taxes and Wages database.ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2011  57
APPENDIX B
MODEL DESCRIPTION
This appendix describes the models estimated in Section II of this 
paper. The analysis in Section II starts by looking at aggregate measures 
of expenditures on both active and passive labor market policies.29 A 
model is estimated using a fixed-effects panel regression for the unem-
ployment rate in country i in year t based on the following equation:
Unemployment Rateit
=βi+β1(Labor Force Participation Rate)it+ β2(Union Density)it
+ β3(Employment Protection)it+β4(Tax Wedge)it+ β5(Output Gap)it
+ β6(ALMP)it+ β7(PLMP)it+εit
The βi represents country i’s fixed effect and εit is an error term. 
Union density is the ratio of wage earners who are members of a 
trade union to the total number of wage/salary workers. ALMP and 
PLMP represent expenditures on active and passive labor market 
policies per unemployed worker as a percentage of GDP per capita, 
respectively. The βj are estimated and represent the effects of a one 
unit increase of each variable on the unemployment rate.
The second specification breaks down PLMP into the replacement 
ratio and duration of unemployment benefits:
Unemployment Rateit
= βi+β1(Labor Force Participation Rate)it+ β2(Union Density)it
+ β3(Employment Protection)it+β4(Tax Wedge)it+ β5(Output Gap)it
+ β6(ALMP)it+ β7(Initial Unemployment Benefit Replacement Ratio)it 
+ β8(Unemployment Benefit Duration)it+εit58  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The third specification breaks down ALMP into major categories, 
as follows:
Unemployment Rateit
=βi+β1(Labor Force Participation Rate)it+ β2(Union Density)it
+ β3(Employment Protection)it+ β4(Tax Wedge)it+β5(Output Gap)it 
+ β6(Initial Unemployment Benefit Replacement Ratio)it
+ β7(Unemployment Benefit Duration)it+β8(Job-Search Assistance)it
+β9(Employment Incentives)it+β10(Supported Employment)it
+β11(Training)it+β12(Direct Job Creation)it+β13(Other Policies)it
+εitECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2011  59
APPENDIX C
  TWO APPROACHES FOR THE 
 COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
This section describes the two approaches used to conduct the 
cost-effectiveness analysis.
Approach 1 
The first approach uses Okun’s law to determine the extent to 
which GDP changes with changes in the unemployment rate.
Step 1. For a given type of ALMP, suppose the current expendi-
tures per unemployed as a percentage of GDP per capita are increased 
by 1 percentage point. The total cost (as a percentage of GDP) of   
doing so can be computed from the current total expenditures of this 
type of ALMP as a percentage of GDP and the current expenditures per  
unemployed worker as a percentage of GDP per capita. Call this number x.   
Example. Suppose the current expenditures on training programs per 
unemployed worker are 5 percent of GDP per capita and the total 
expenditures of training are 0.2 percent of GDP. Then, the cost (as a 
percentage of GDP) of increasing the expenditures per unemployed 
on training from 5 percent to 6 percent of GDP per capita is equal to 
0.2×(6−5)/5=0.04 percent of GDP.30
Step 2. Estimate the relationship between the change in the unem-
ployment rate and GDP growth (Okun’s law) using the data from the 
same set of OECD countries over the same period used in the previous 
section. This provides an estimate of the amount y that GDP growth 
will increase if the unemployment rate falls by 1 percentage point. In 
addition, the model presented in Section II provides an estimate of 
the change in the unemployment rate resulting from this 1 percentage 
point increase in expenditures per unemployed worker as a percentage 
of GDP per capita. Call this amount z. 
Step 3. Given the GDP level in the previous year, a 1 percentage 
point increase in the GDP growth rate in this year means that the GDP 
level increases by 1 percent in this year. In this way, the change in GDP 
growth can be linked to the change of the level of GDP. Thus, using 
the estimates in Step 2, if the expenditures per unemployed of this type 60  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
of ALMP increase by 1 percent of GDP per capita, it will increase the 
level of GDP level by percent.
Step 4. If, yz > x the total added GDP exceeds the total expen-
ditures on this type of ALMP, thus, it is cost-effective; otherwise, the 
policy is not cost-effective. 
Approach 2
The second approach directly calculates the change in GDP after 
making certain assumptions about changes in the labor force and the 
productivity of workers.
Step 1. For a given type of ALMP, suppose the current expendi-
tures per unemployed as a percentage of GDP per capita will be in-
creased by 1 percentage point. The total cost (as a percentage of GDP) 
of doing this can be calculated from the current expenditures on this 
type of ALMP as a percentage of GDP and the current expenditures 
per unemployed as a percentage of GDP per capita. Call this number x. 
In addition, the model presented in Section II provides an estimate of 
the change in the unemployment rate resulting from this 1 percentage 
point increase in expenditures per unemployed as a percentage of GDP 
per capita on this type of ALMP. Call this amount y.
Step 2. To calculate the GDP change due to a 1 percentage point 
change in the unemployment rate, two assumptions are needed: the 
change in the labor force and the relative productivity of newly em-
ployed workers. A decrease in the unemployment rate will increase 
GDP by an amount that depends on the size of the labor force, aver-
age productivity of new workers, and the current unemployment rate. 
Specifically, a y-percentage-point decrease in the unemployment rate 
will increase GDP by [a+(100+a)×y/(100+u)]×b percent, where a is the 
change in the labor force, b is the average productivity of newly em-
ployed workers compared with all employed workers, and u is the cur-
rent unemployment rate (in percentage points).31 Basically, this formu-
la says that, holding other things unchanged, an increase in the size of 
the labor force will increase GDP, because more workers are employed. 
Similarly, the more productive newly employed workers are, the greater 
the increase in GDP.
Step 3. If the change in GDP (as calculated above) is greater than x, 
the total added GDP exceeds the total expenditures on this type of ALMP 
and thus it is cost-effective; otherwise, the policy is not cost-effective. ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2011  61
ENDNOTES
1Financing systems for UI and UA differ across countries. Most countries 
considered in this article pay UI benefits out of a government-established fund, 
which primarily is financed by payroll contributions from employers and work-
ers but may be supplemented by public funds. Some Nordic countries have a 
more complex system. In Finland, for example, there are three sources of funds: 
a basic UI benefit that is paid by the government out of public funds, a system of 
32 unemployment funds (divided by profession) that receive contributions from 
their member employees, and a government-established Unemployment Insur-
ance Fund that is funded by contributions from workers and employers. In most 
countries, UA is funded through central or municipal governments.
2Disability benefits, such as those offered by Social Security Disability Insur-
ance in the United States, typically fall outside the scope of labor market policies 
considered in this article.
3For instance, some countries compensate workers for wages not paid due 
to employer insolvency. In Sweden, the employees of a firm that is in bankruptcy 
proceedings and has insufficient assets to cover employees’ wages may receive 
compensation from the state under the terms of the Wage Guarantee Act. A few 
countries compensate or provide assistance to employees who have been made 
redundant. Prior to 2004, Finland compensated workers over age 45 who became 
unemployed due to “financial or production-related problems for the employer.”   
However, compensation was contingent on seeking retraining or a new job.    
4Other types of start-up subsidies, such as those focusing on the unemployed 
during the early employment period, already existed in Germany from 1986.
5However, other categories of ALMP, such as employment incentives, sup-
ported employment, and direct job creation, are intended to help boost the de-
mand for workers.
6For example, see Layard and others, Bassanini and Duval, and Schmitt. 
7For example, see OECD Employment Outlook 2006.
8Appendix A provides a detailed description of the data sources and the defi-
nition of each variable used in the regressions.
9 Appendix B provides more details on the regression models considered in 
this article. Although the model estimated in this article is similar to that used 
by Layard and others, there are several important differences. First, this article 
includes more explanatory variables. In particular, the current model includes 
major categories of ALMP, which are the focus of this article. Second, this article 
uses more recent data to estimate the model. Third, the article estimates a panel 
regression with fixed effects while Layard and others apply OLS regression to the 
countries’ averages over sample years. As in Bassanini and Duval, the model in 
this article includes the tax wedge and the output gap, which are found to have 
significant effects on the unemployment rate.62  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
10The sample does not cover all OECD countries because some do not have 
complete (or near-complete) data over 1998-2008. The 20 countries  —Austria, 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hunga-
ry, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In one robustness check, 
the analysis also included data for the United States, Canada, Japan, and South 
Korea. These four countries had very little spending on ALMP during the sample 
period. Including them in the regression does not change the main findings of 
this article.
11As shown in Table 1 (specifications 1 and 2), the estimates are significant 
at the 95 percent level and are robust to the inclusion of different measures of 
PLMP. Qualitatively speaking, these findings also are robust to various lag choic-
es, or measuring spending as a fraction of GDP. The OECD average level refers to 
the average level of the 20 OECD countries studied in this article.
12The effect of increasing unemployment benefit duration on the unem-
ployment rate is calculated based on the empirical findings in Table 1, model 
specification 2. Because countries have different institutional frameworks, find-
ing a consistent measure of unemployment benefit duration can be problematic. 
Instead, the literature uses a measure of how quickly unemployment benefits 
decline as a measure of the actual unemployment benefit duration. That is, a 
more rapid decline in unemployment benefits corresponds to a shorter duration 
of benefits and vice versa. Thus, following the approach used in the OECD Em-
ployment Outlook, the measure used in this article is defined as how much total 
unemployment benefits have declined from the average level in the first year to 
the average level in the first five years. For example, the average level of this mea-
sure in the 20 OECD countries studied in this article over 1998-2008 is about 
0.6, which means that the average level of the unemployment benefits in the first 
five years is about 60 percent of the average level of the unemployment benefits 
in the first year. Assuming benefits decline at a constant rate, the unemployment 
benefits will decline 40 percent in (5−1)/2=2 years, or 20 percent per year. In 
other words, the benefits last approximately five years. Following the same logic, 
if the benefits last for one more year, to six years, the rate of decline is about 17 
percent per year. At this speed, the average level of the unemployment benefits 
in the first five years is 66 percent of the average level in the first year. Using the 
estimated model coefficient for unemployment benefit duration, 4.82, increasing 
the unemployment benefit duration by one year will increase the unemployment 
rate by (0.66−0.60)×4.82=0.29 percentage point. 
13These findings are consistent with several recent studies. For example, see 
Kluve and Schmidt, and Card and others.
14The estimates also differ in their statistical significance. The estimate for 
job-search assistance is significant at the 90 percent level, while the estimate for 
training is significant at the 95 percent level.ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2011  63
15According to the OECD classification, benefit administration expenditures 
include those used to manage the unemployment and early retirement benefits 
and labor market programs, which cannot be separated from the expenditures 
in PLMP and other ALMP. In addition to benefit administration, this group   
contains two other small programs: start-up incentives, and job rotation and job 
sharing. However, the expenditures on these two programs are usually very small 
(for example, for job rotation and job sharing, the average expenditures as a per-
cent of GDP over OECD countries is less than 0.01 for most of the years in 1998-
2008). Thus, this article does not study them separately.
16Using OECD data between 1985 and 2002, Bassanini and Duval also 
found that increasing ALMP spending on youth and disabled unemployed work-
ers does not lead to a reduction in the unemployment rate. Although the results 
are not reported in the table, conducting the analysis again to include participant 
stocks in direct job-creation programs finds that the unemployment rate decreases 
when the participant stocks in direct job-creation programs increase. This find-
ing and the results in the table suggest that the allocation of spending and the 
efficiency of that allocation are crucial in determining the effects of ALMP on the 
unemployment rate. Of course, an alternative possibility is that by spending more 
money per job created, the government is creating higher-wage jobs and therefore 
improving the welfare of the participants in these direct job-creation programs.
17Although the basic idea of a cost-effectiveness analysis is straightforward, it 
is challenging to precisely measure the associated benefits in practice for several 
reasons. First, by definition, the benefits are computed under the assumption 
that all other factors are fixed. In other words, any models that try to uncover 
the “unobservable” benefits have to control for all the factors that might affect 
the outcomes. This is challenging because no model can account for all factors, 
and data are not always available for some factors. Second, the benefits of some 
programs may vary over time. This raises the question of what time frame should 
be used to measure the benefits. For example, Nie shows that training programs 
exhibit a trade-off between short-term and long-term effects. Because it takes 
time to improve workers’ skills, in the short term these programs will hold work-
ers in them, which reduces the workers’ employment probabilities. This is called 
the “lock-in” effect in the empirical literature. However, over a relatively longer 
period, training programs may improve employability by giving workers the nec-
essary skills to match with jobs.  
18See note 12 for more information on how the cost is calculated. Note that 
earlier the cost was expressed as $274 per unemployed worker, whereas the cost is 
now expressed as the total amount ($230 million). 
19The regression model contains the output gap as an explanatory variable. 
Thus, the cost-effectiveness analysis assumes ex ante that output and the output 
gap are fixed when calculating the effect of ALMP on the unemployment rate, 
even though in the second step output is allowed to vary. This endogeneity be-64  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
tween unemployment and output may bias the cost-effectiveness analysis: The 
results presented may actually be too conservative, because a dollar of ALMP 
spending may reduce the unemployment rate and lead to faster GDP growth and 
a smaller output gap, which in turn reduces unemployment further, and so on. 
Developing a general equilibrium model to address this endogeneity is beyond 
the scope of this article.
20Okun’s law posits a negative relationship between GDP growth and chang-
es in the unemployment rate: Rapid GDP growth is associated with declines in 
unemployment, and slow or negative GDP growth is associated with increases in 
unemployment. See Knotek.
21The main idea of this approach is that if the change in the labor force 
is known, the change in unemployment can be directly translated to a change 
in employment. Furthermore, the change in employment can be translated to a 
change in GDP if the relative productivity of newly employed workers is known. 
Appendix C provides more details on these two approaches.
22There also is a trade-off between the short-term effects and the long-term 
effects. Because workers can still accumulate human capital during the employ-
ment period, their productivity may increase as they become employed for a lon-
ger time.
23To illustrate the main idea, the analysis considers a static scenario. Ideally, 
the benefits associated with a certain program may accumulate over a longer time. 
24These estimates do not include workers who already have left the labor force.
25Although the phenomenon of “house lock” has been discussed quite exten-
sively, it is not easy to measure its effects on the unemployment rate due to limits 
on data availability. Several recent studies using U.S. state-level data show that the 
impact of “house lock” on workers’ state-to-state mobility is limited (Aaronson 
and Davis, Şahin and others).  
26Knotek and Terry discuss several aspects of the nature of recoveries from 
financial crises that also may be contributing to sustained high unemployment.
27These estimates assume that expenditures on ALMP in the United States as 
a percentage of GDP increase proportionally with increases in the U.S. unemploy-
ment rate. For example, average expenditures on active labor market policies in the 
United States were approximately 0.16 percent of GDP during the period 1998-
2008. However, the average U.S. unemployment rate in the first half of 2011 was 
1.8 times the average over the sample period. Thus, this article assumes that the 
U.S. expenditures on ALMP as a percentage of GDP rose to 0.16×1.8=0.29 percent 
of GDP. Based on the estimates from Section II, total expenditures would have to 
be increased by approximately 181 percent in order to use ALMP to reduce the un-
employment rate by 1 percentage point, which is about 0.29×181%=0.52 percent 
of GDP. Using a projection for the level of U.S. GDP in 2011, the estimated costs 
would be approximately $79.5 billion (in 2011 dollars). ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2011  65
28In addition to their small size, Table 1 shows that these types of active 
spending policies do not reduce unemployment in a statistically significant way.
29Following the literature, the spending on labor market policies is measured 
by the expenditures per unemployed worker as a percentage of GDP per capita (as 
also explained in Section I). By construction, the expenditures per unemployed 
worker are correlated with the unemployment rate in the same time period. To 
mitigate the endogeneity problem caused by this definition, this article uses the 
one-period lagged unemployment rate and GDP per capita to construct the ex-
penditures variables that will be on the right hand side in the regressions. In one 
robustness check, this article also used expenditures on ALMP as a percentage of 
one-period lagged GDP to replace the above definition and found the results are 
robust to this alternative specification.
30In this calculation, the total number of unemployed workers is fixed. So, in-
creasing expenditures per unemployed worker from 5 percent of GDP per capita 
to 6 percent implies that the total expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) increase 
by 20 percent (that is, 100×(6−5)/5=20. In the model presented in Section II, the 
lagged unemployment rate is used to calculate the expenditures per unemployed, 
which is consistent with the assumption of fixing the number of unemployed used 
in this calculation.
31Let L be the size of the labor force (in levels), E be the amount of employed 
(in levels), U be the amount of unemployed (in levels), and u be the unemploy-
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Let b be the productivity of newly employed workers relative to those already 
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